Wema: Lending Boldly, Lending Well?

The test of a bank is not whether it can lend. Any bank can lend. The test is whether it can lend safely and profitably, and in that order, because a loan that earns a high return today but is not repaid tomorrow destroys both profit and safety. Lending is the highest earning asset in the balance sheet, the most illiquid asset, and the most risky operation a bank undertakes. It finances manufacturers, farmers, traders, professionals, real estate developers and individuals, and in doing so it exposes the bank to the failure of every one of those borrowers. A good banker is therefore a shrewd lender, one who lends money safely and profitably. In the nine months to September 2026, Wema Bank made a bold claim to that title. The question is whether the numbers support the claim, or merely flatter it.
On profitability, the claim is strong. Loans and advances rose 44.49% to ₦2.51 trillion, from ₦1.74 trillion in December 2025. That expansion was the engine of the bank’s earnings. Net interest income, the spread between the rate at which the bank borrows and the rate at which it lends, rose 38.31% to ₦325.88 billion. Interest income rose 37.21% to ₦543.56 billion, even though interest expense also rose 35.60% to ₦217.68 billion. In other words, Wema lent more, and it lent at a spread that more than covered its rising funding cost. Operating income rose 52.72% to ₦437.02 billion. Profit before tax rose 76.62% to ₦258.64 billion. Profit after tax rose 72.56% to ₦219.84 billion, already above the full-year 2025 profit of ₦194.46 billion. Annualised return on assets was 4.69% and return on equity was 41.56%. For a bank that was once dismissed as a mid-tier player, those are not modest returns. They are the returns of a bank that has learned how to make its loan book work.
On safety, the claim is more qualified, but still credible in the period. Impairment loss on financial assets rose 21.18% to ₦18.54 billion, which on its own sounds like rising risk. Set against the scale of new lending, it looks different. Impairment as a share of operating income fell from 5.35% to 4.24%. Annualised cost of risk was a moderate 1.16% of average loans. Net interest income after impairment rose 39.50% to ₦307.34 billion. That means the bank absorbed higher credit costs and still grew its core earnings sharply. It did not achieve profitability by ignoring credit risk. It achieved profitability after providing for it. That is the first mark of safe lending.
The second mark is the funding behind the lending. Wema did not lend from a shrinking base. Customer deposits rose 17.40% to ₦3.86 trillion, cash and cash equivalents rose 65.82% to ₦1.56 trillion, and operating cash flow was ₦1.13 trillion. The bank had liquidity to lend. But here the critical qualification begins. Loans grew 2.5 times faster than deposits. The loan-to-deposit ratio jumped from 52.83% to 65.02%. Other liabilities surged 156.69% to ₦2.59 trillion. Deposits from banks rose from nil to ₦57.29 billion. Wema lent boldly, but it funded that boldness increasingly from non-deposit liabilities, which are faster to obtain and faster to withdraw. Safe lending is not only about choosing good borrowers. It is also about funding long loans with stable funds. A bank that borrows short and lends long must always be able to honour its own obligations, and a funding mix that leans on other liabilities makes that task harder. Wema was profitable in its lending. It was less safe in how it funded it.
The third mark is capital. Safe lending requires a buffer for when some borrowers fail, as some always will. Wema’s buffer thinned even as its loan book grew. Total assets rose 46.42% to ₦7.43 trillion, while equity rose only 27.34% to ₦790.13 billion. The equity-to-assets ratio fell from 12.23% to 10.64%. Retained earnings rose 77.24% to ₦381.18 billion, which is genuine strength, but it was not enough to keep pace with asset growth. The bank is using each naira of equity to support more naira of loans and securities. That amplifies profit in good times, and it amplifies loss in bad times. A shrewd lender does not only ask whether a loan will be repaid. He asks whether the bank can survive if it is not. On that test, Wema is more exposed than it was at the start of the year.
The fourth mark is diversification. A bank that depends only on lending is hostage to lending. Wema reduced that dependence. Non-interest income rose to 29.67% of operating income, from 22.94% a year earlier. Net fee and commission income rose 28.44% to ₦55.14 billion. Net trading income rose 332.07% to ₦46.08 billion. Net gain on FVTPL securities rose 876.88% to ₦10.42 billion. The cost-to-income ratio improved from 48.83% to 40.82%, showing that the bank grew income faster than it grew cost. That matters for safe lending, because a bank with diversified income can absorb a rise in impairments without collapsing into loss. It has room to be patient with borrowers, to restructure rather than to panic. But it also matters as a warning. Trading gains of that size are market-dependent. If they normalise, the bank will lean more heavily on its loan book again, and the safety of that book will matter even more.
The final mark is the most important and the least visible in nine months: time. A loan book that grows 44.49% in nine months has not yet been tested by a full cycle. The borrowers who took those loans have not yet had to repay them through a downturn, a devaluation, or a rise in rates. The fact that Wema cannot easily call in loans without chasing customers away or signalling weakness means it must live with the credit decisions it has made. Its impairment charge is contained today. Its true credit quality will only be known when those loans mature. That is why the verdict on Wema must be interpretative, not celebratory. It has shown it can lend profitably. It has shown it can provide for credit losses while still growing profit. It has shown it can expand credit to the community while improving efficiency. What it has not yet shown is whether it can lend safely through adversity, with a funding base that is stable enough, a capital buffer that is thick enough, and a loan book that is seasoned enough to survive its own ambition.
Wema’s management in the nine months to September 2026 therefore deserves credit, but not complacency. It lent boldly and it lent profitably. It kept credit costs contained, it diversified income, and it improved efficiency. But it also lent faster than deposits, faster than capital, and faster than the seasoning of its own book. Safe and profitable lending is not proved by one strong period. It is proved by surviving the period that follows. Wema has passed the first test. The second test is still to come.



