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FCMB: THE FALLEN MODEL BRAND — How Excellence Became A Treadmill

There was a time when to say FCMB was to say the future, when a young, fleet-footed bank founded in 1982 by the banking legend Otunba Subomi Balogun walked into a room full of old, tired, government-owned giants and made them look slow, and the secret was not money, because FCMB did not have the most money, the secret was a stubborn, almost arrogant belief in excellence, in superior service delivery, in doing in hours what others did in days, in treating a customer not as a file but as a relationship, and for years that belief worked, it made FCMB a model brand, a case study, a bank that other banks benchmarked, a bank that proved a smaller institution could out-think, out-serve and out-perform bigger rivals if it had vision, discipline and speed, but today, if you walk into that same room, you will hear a different story, you will hear of a bank with stunted steps, cyclical profitability and lethargic speed, a bank that has been overtaken by younger ones miles away, a bank that still exists, still declares profit, still opens branches, but no longer sets the pace, no longer makes the rules, no longer frightens its competitors, and the question that hangs over Lagos, over the Nigerian Exchange, over every former staff who remembers the Balogun years, is a painful one, what happened to excellence, and how did a champion become a weakling on a treadmill, running faster every year just to stay in the same place.

The answer begins not with fraud, not with collapse, not with a scandal, but with something far more ordinary and far more dangerous, the slow substitution of maintenance for architecture, because strong companies are architects, they imagine tomorrow’s businesses, they ask what new competencies they must build, what new products they must pioneer, what new alliances they must form, what nascent programmes they must protect even when quarterly profit screams for cuts, while weak companies are maintenance engineers, they keep today’s business humming, they debate overhead allocations, they worry about winning the next contract, they respond to a competitor’s price cut, and FCMB, born an architect, has become a maintenance engineer, its strategic language in recent years has no longer been about creating new markets but about balance sheet efficiency and optimisation, repricing the deposit base, meeting the N500 billion capital target ahead of the March 2026 deadline, improving cost-to-income, and those are necessary tasks, no serious bank can ignore them, but they are not a vision for the future, they are the language of survival, and when you compare that language to the champions, the difference becomes brutal, because Access Holdings did not just meet capital requirements, it used mergers, acquisitions and pan-African expansion to become Africa’s biggest bank by assets, Zenith did not just survive recapitalisation, it used it to build an equity base of nearly N4.9 trillion, GTCO did not just cut costs, it built a payments, fintech and holding-company architecture that redefined what a Nigerian bank could be, while FCMB spent the last decade preserving the past, the champions spent it creating the future, and in banking, as in life, you cannot preserve your way to leadership.

The numbers tell that story without sentiment, and they must be faced honestly, even though FCMB’s 2025 result looks spectacular on the surface, with profit after tax rising by 141.72% to N177.27 billion and gross revenue crossing N1.13 trillion for the first time, driven by a 61.68% rise in interest income and net interest income more than doubling to N505.91 billion, and with total assets growing to N7.63 trillion and shareholders’ equity expanding to N836.41 billion, those figures, taken alone, would suggest a revival, but placed beside the champions they reveal a chasm that no single good year can close, because Access Holdings closed 2025 with total assets of N51.57 trillion, United Bank for Africa with N33.17 trillion, Zenith Bank with N31.4 trillion, First HoldCo with N27.25 trillion, and GTCO, the smallest Tier-1 by assets, with N17.8 trillion, which means Access is 6.7 times bigger than FCMB by assets, Zenith is 4.1 times bigger, UBA is 4.3 times bigger, and even GTCO is 2.3 times bigger, and FCMB’s entire balance sheet of N7.63 trillion is less than GTCO’s deposits alone, a reality that cannot be explained away by saying FCMB is a Tier-2 bank, because Tier-2 is not a destiny, it is a verdict, it is what happens when a bank that once led decides, year after year, to follow.

Deposits, the lifeblood of any bank, tell the same story in even starker terms, because a bank that cannot grow deposits cannot grow loans, cannot grow income, and cannot shape the future, it can only manage decline profitably, and in 2025 FCMB grew customer deposits by only 2.3%, from N4.30 trillion to N4.40 trillion, while Access grew deposits by 53.44% to N34.56 trillion, Zenith held N24.3 trillion, UBA held N23.95 trillion, and GTCO held N12.87 trillion, which means FCMB’s deposit base is barely one-eighth of Access’s and barely one-third of GTCO’s, and when a bank grows deposits at 2.3% in an economy where inflation is in double digits, it is not growing at all, it is shrinking in real terms, it is losing the trust of savers, the loyalty of corporates, the daily transactions of traders, students, SMEs and diaspora customers who are choosing other banks for speed, for apps, for networks, for service, for the very excellence FCMB once promised, and Proshare’s own ranking confirms this humiliation, that FCMB occupies second position in the Tier-2 peer group by total assets, behind Stanbic IBTC at N8.62 trillion and ahead of Wema at N5.07 trillion and Sterling at N3.91 trillion, but with the smallest market capitalisation in its peer group at N791.46 billion as of June 9, 2026, trailing Stanbic IBTC at N2.61 trillion and even Wema at N1.24 trillion, an anomaly that the market is using to say, in cold numbers, we do not believe this recovery is yet structural.

Profitability, too, reveals the classic signature of the weakling, which is not loss, but cyclical profitability, one good year after three flat years, followed by another slump, while champions deliver consistent, compounding profitability, and FCMB’s 2025 bounce must be read against that history, because in 2024 its return on average equity was only 12.7%, in 2025 it jumped to 23.24%, and that jump, while commendable, was driven largely by the deployment of N147.5 billion from its 2024 public offer into investment securities and earning assets, which fuelled the doubling of net interest income, and by a high interest rate environment that lifted all banks, not by the creation of a new market, not by a breakthrough product, not by a new competency that rivals cannot copy, and that is denominator management, not numerator creation, the accountant’s shortcut to asset productivity, cutting the denominator, raising capital, repricing deposits, improving cost-to-income from 59.90% to 53.75%, which is real progress, but still leaves FCMB spending 53.75 kobo to earn every naira, while GTCO spends only about 27.9 kobo and Zenith about 45.2 kobo, and while Zenith delivers profit after tax of N1.04 trillion and GTCO profit before tax of N1.23 trillion, FCMB, even in its best year ever, delivers N177.3 billion, which is less than one-sixth of Zenith’s profit, and the market knows this, which is why FCMB trades at approximately 0.69 times book value and a price-to-earnings ratio of 3.01 times, a valuation discount that says investors will not pay for future earnings they do not yet trust, while GTCO commands a market capitalisation of N4.37 trillion, Zenith about N4.76 trillion, and even UBA N1.83 trillion, all multiples of FCMB’s N791 billion.

Why did this happen, and why does it matter beyond one bank, and here the framework of strong versus weak players becomes not theory but biography, because FCMB fell for the three sins of the treadmill, first, it chose restructuring and reengineering over regeneration, spending years on capital raising, cost-to-income improvement, CASA repricing from 57.48% to 65.41%, and regulatory compliance, which are reengineering tasks that make a company smaller and better, not different, and a company that gets better without getting different surrenders tomorrow’s businesses, as Xerox did when it perfected copiers while Canon and others invented the future, second, it became a rule-taker, not a rule-maker, Access made the rules on pan-African expansion, GTBank made the rules on digital banking and customer experience, Zenith made the rules on corporate banking and risk discipline, FCMB followed them, it benchmarked others more than others benchmarked it, its transformation agenda was driven by competitors’ actions rather than by its own unique vision, and third, it let the urgent drive out the important, because weak companies devote less than 3% of senior management energy to building a corporate perspective on the future, while champions devote 20% to 50% over several months, and FCMB’s history of stunted steps and lethargic speed suggests it fell into that trap, busy surviving recapitalisation, managing non-performing loans, defending market share, while champions were asking where the next N10 billion, N100 billion, N1 trillion of revenue growth would come from, not just where the next cost saving would come from, and the result is a bank that is still respected, still solvent, still capable of a good year, but no longer feared, no longer copied, no longer leading, a bank that has mastered the art of getting smaller faster than it gets better, or getting better without getting different, both of which are roads to the same destination, irrelevance.

Yet to call FCMB a weakling is not to write its obituary, it is to issue a warning and an invitation, because the same 2025 numbers that expose its weakness also contain the seeds of a return, a CASA ratio improved to 65.41%, a capital adequacy ratio that rose to 26.95% as at March 2026 after additional capital, total equity up to N835.4 billion at end-2025 and N1.14 trillion by March 2026, assets under management up 24.2% to N1.70 trillion, and a growing pensions and asset management franchise that could become a new competency if protected, and the question is whether FCMB will use this breathing space to do what champions do, to answer the five questions weaklings avoid, what new core competencies will it build that Access, Zenith and GTCO do not have, what new product concept will it pioneer in SME banking, agri-fintech, diaspora banking or youth banking that will make it a rule-maker again, what alliance will give it distribution it cannot build alone, what nascent programme will it protect even when quarterly profit pressures demand cuts, what regulatory initiative will it lead, not follow, because until it does, it will remain what it is today, a cautionary tale that excellence is not a birthright, it is a daily choice, Balogun built a bank that pursued excellence, his successors have managed a bank that pursues survival, and the gap between those two verbs, pursue excellence versus pursue survival, is the gap between N7.63 trillion and N51.57 trillion, between N177 billion and N1.04 trillion, between a model brand and a weakling on a treadmill, running faster every year just to stay in the same place, and the tragedy is not that FCMB has fallen, the tragedy would be if it mistakes a good year for a good strategy, and settles for being better, when what it needs, desperately, is to become different.

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