When President Bola Ahmed Tinubu argues in the Financial Times that Africa pays a $75bn annual penalty for mispriced risk, he steps into a debate that is both empirical and political. The so-called “Africa premium” is not fiction; data from multilateral institutions and market spreads confirm that African sovereigns have often borrowed at materially higher costs than similarly rated peers. Yet, invoking Nigeria’s recent upgrades by Fitch Ratings and Moody’s Investors Service as proof that transparency has conquered bias risks stretches the argument.

Yes, reform has been acknowledged. Yields tightened. Policy coherence improved. But Nigeria remains firmly in speculative-grade territory, with structural vulnerabilities that ratings agencies are mandated to price. One cannot simultaneously indict the global rating architecture as biased and cite its positive verdict as vindication without confronting the tension.

The Africa premium is real. The case for an African Credit Rating Agency deserves serious consideration. But reform momentum is not the same as structural resolution, and narrative clarity must not outrun fiscal reality.

The Core Argument

On February 16, 2026, Dr. Jumoke Oduwole, Nigeria’s Minister of Trade, posted on X to amplify a Financial Times opinion article by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu. The message was direct and unapologetic: the President advocated for an African credit rating agency to dismantle the “Africa premium”, a biased risk assessment she described as costing the continent $75 billion annually. She cited Nigeria’s recent rating upgrades as proof that “transparency and bold reforms yield results.”

The underlying FT article by Mr President is substantive. Writing from the platform of the 38th AU Heads of State Summit in Addis Ababa, President Tinubu made the case that Africa’s access to international capital is distorted by the dominance of three global rating agencies, Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P Global, whose assessments, he argued, frequently fail to reflect economic fundamentals on the ground. His core contention deserves careful examination, not least because it is simultaneously right and strategically selective.

“The greatest weakness of the big three rating agencies is their limited ground presence; their models weigh quantitative data against subjective judgements on political risk, institutional strength, and policy durability.”— President Tinubu, Financial Times, February 2026

What Holds Up Under Scrutiny

The $75 billion figure is not political rhetoric; it is grounded in credible institutional research. A 2023 UNDP report attributed that cost to what it termed “idiosyncrasies” in credit ratings, resulting in excess interest payments and foregone lending opportunities. The President cited the same study in his FT article, and the numbers are defensible.

There is substantial empirical backing for the existence of a systematic bias. Pre-pandemic data showed African Eurobond spreads exceeding those of similarly rated emerging market peers by 200 to 400 basis points, a material differential that cannot be explained by fundamentals alone. The UN Economic Commission for Africa has concluded that major rating agencies continue to make significant errors in their sovereign assessments of African countries. These are not fringe claims; they are documented findings from multilateral institutions with no political axe to grind.

Tinubu’s point about procyclical downgrades also carries weight. As he wrote in the FT:

“Many countries across the continent have export-led economies based on commodities. When prices fall, or markets tighten, African nations are downgraded swiftly and broadly, even when their reserves are strong, fiscal buffers are intact, and debt profiles remain manageable.”— President Tinubu, Financial Times, February 2026

This is empirically observed and analytically sound. The herd behaviour of rating agencies during commodity downturns has long been a persistent complaint, not only in Africa. The establishment of an African Credit Rating Agency to provide context-intelligent, complementary assessments addresses a genuine information asymmetry. The case for AfCRA, on its merits, is compelling.

Where the Narrative Needs Tempering

It is in the second half of the argument, the use of Nigeria’s recent rating upgrades as validation of the reform agenda, that analytical caution is warranted.

1. The speculative-grade reality

Nigeria’s upgrades, while welcome and directionally positive, moved the sovereign from deeply distressed territory to merely highly speculative. Fitch upgraded Nigeria to B from B– in April 2025. Moody’s followed in May, moving the sovereign from Caa1 to B3. S&P revised the outlook to Positive in November 2025. These are meaningful improvements. 

But even after these upgrades, Nigeria remains firmly in the speculative-grade category, still rated below several African peers and well below investment grade. Presenting these as triumphal proof of reform success overstates the current position. There is a meaningful difference between leaving the emergency room and being discharged.

2. The structural vulnerabilities that persist

Non-oil revenue still constitutes less than 7.5% of GDP. Oil production averages 1.45 million barrels per day, well below the OPEC quota of 1.8 million. Over 65% of domestic debt is short-term, creating persistent refinancing risk. Inflation, while declining from its 33.7% peak, remains elevated. 

These are precisely the kinds of fundamental weaknesses that rating agencies, whether in London, Lagos, or Addis Ababa, are mandated to reflect. An African Credit Rating Agency that ignores them would fail the very credibility test that Tinubu himself identifies in the FT article:

“An African credit rating agency will not suffice on its own. The agency must earn the confidence of global capital with assessments anchored in the sort of timely, comprehensive data to which international markets respond.”— President Tinubu, Financial Times, February 2026

This is one of the most analytically honest passage in the op-ed. It implicitly concedes that AfCRA’s value proposition must be analytical superiority, not political convenience. If AfCRA consistently produces more favourable ratings than the Big Three, international investors will discount them. The credibility challenge is enormous, and Tinubu, to his credit, does not duck it.

3. The logical tension at the heart of the argument

There is a contradiction that the analytical community cannot overlook. The President simultaneously argues that the Big Three rating agencies are structurally biased against Africa, yet cites their upgrades of Nigeria as evidence that his reforms are working. You cannot credibly dismiss the agencies’ methodology when it produces unfavourable outcomes and then parade their positive assessments as vindication. Either their judgements carry analytical weight, or they don’t.

The more intellectually consistent position would be that the agencies’ frameworks are imperfect and systematically biased, but not entirely without signal; reforms that improve fundamentals will eventually move ratings, even within a flawed system; and the continent’s ambition should be to build institutions that generate better assessments, not merely friendlier ones. That argument would be stronger because it would be honest about what Nigeria has achieved, and what it has not.

The Data Transparency Argument: Tinubu’s Strongest Card

The most compelling section of the FT article is not the call for AfCRA itself, but the President’s acknowledgement that better data has been partly responsible for Nigeria’s upgrades. He lists concrete actions: rebasing GDP, publishing more budget documents, bringing previously off-balance-sheet central bank lending into the public debt register, removing the fuel subsidy, and liberalising the exchange rate.

“Better data has been partly responsible for Nigeria’s recent upgrades: improving the timeliness and breadth of economic statistics; bringing off-balance-sheet central bank lending previously into the public debt register.”— President Tinubu, Financial Times, February 2026

This is where the op-ed is at its most credible, because it shifts the argument from grievance to agency. If African sovereigns want better ratings, the first-order requirement is better data. The Big Three can be criticised for their subjective overlays and limited ground presence, but they cannot assess what they cannot see. Tinubu’s candour about Nigeria’s own data deficiencies, and the steps taken to address them, does more for the “end the Africa premium” argument than the rhetorical framing around bias ever could.

The Political Economy Dimension

Minister Oduwole’s amplification of the FT article is strategically deliberate. As Trade Minister, she has an institutional incentive to position Nigeria as a reform champion, to attract capital inflows, improve trade financing terms, and signal policy credibility to multilateral partners. The FT platform gives the argument global institutional visibility that no presidential address at an AU summit could achieve on its own.

But the analytical community, institutional investors, market intelligence platforms, credit analysts, and the policy research ecosystem have different obligations. We must distinguish between legitimate policy advocacy and selective evidence presentation. 

The “Africa premium” is real and documented. The case for AfCRA has merit. The reforms of the Tinubu administration are directionally positive. All of this can be true while also being true that Nigeria, a country still rated deep in speculative territory with persistent fiscal fragility, is not yet the poster child for how transparency conquers bias.

Concluding Thoughts

Dismantling the $75 billion Africa premium is an act of continental leadership. President Tinubu is right to champion it, and the FT op-ed is a consequential piece of financial diplomacy. 

The call for an African Credit Rating Agency addresses a genuine structural deficit in the global financial architecture, one that costs real money, destroys real development potential, and perpetuates a risk perception that has long diverged from reality.

But leadership also requires intellectual honesty about where the reform journey stands. 

Nigeria’s Eurobond yields narrowed by 250 basis points during the 2025 upgrade cycle, reflecting a tangible market impact. Yet the sovereign remains speculative grade. Non-oil revenue remains anaemic. Debt composition remains fragile. The reforms are in the right direction. The momentum is positive. But the victory lap has not yet been earned.

“Africa’s success is not a regional concern, but a global opportunity.”— President Tinubu, Financial Times, February 2026

On this, the President is unequivocally right. The opportunity is real. But opportunities are seized through sustained structural reform and institutional credibility, not through the selective citation of rating actions that, by the agencies’ own taxonomy, remain deeply speculative. The Africa premium will be dismantled by evidence, not by editorials, however well-placed they may be.